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Michael Tonry

Predictions of Dangerousness
in Sentencing: Déjà Vu All
Over Again

ABSTRACT

Predictions of dangerousness are more often wrong than right, use information they shouldn’t, and disproportionately damage minority offenders. Forty
years ago, two-thirds of people predicted to be violent were not. For every
two “true positives,” there were four “false positives.” Contemporary technology is little better: at best, three false positives for every two true positives.
The best-informed specialists say that accuracy topped out a decade ago; further
improvement is unlikely. All prediction instruments use ethically unjustiﬁable information. Most include variables such as youth and gender that are
as unjust as race or eye color would be. No one can justly be blamed for being
blue-eyed, young, male, or dark-skinned. All prediction instruments incorporate socioeconomic status variables that cause black, other minority, and disadvantaged offenders to be treated more harshly than white and privileged
offenders. All use criminal history variables that are inﬂated for black and other
minority offenders by deliberate and implicit bias, racially disparate practices,
proﬁling, and drug law enforcement that targets minority individuals and
neighborhoods.

Were the American philosopher Yogi Berra a social scientist, and alive,
he would likely describe his reaction to recent debates about predictions
of dangerousness in sentencing as déjà vu all over again. Except concerning
technical statistical issues, all the major critiques offered in recent years
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were offered in the 1970s and 1980s. Predictions of future violence by individuals are substantially more often wrong than right. Check. Minority
offenders are more often incorrectly predicted to be violent than are white
offenders. Check. Use of socioeconomic status variables in prediction instruments is per se unjust and disproportionately affects minority offenders. Check. Use of criminal history variables exaggerates differences between minority and white offenders and increases racial disparities. Check.
It is unjust ever to punish someone more severely than he or she deserves
because of a prediction of dangerousness (or for any other reason). Check.
Increasing the severity of a sentence on the basis of risk prediction in effect punishes many offenders for crimes that would not have happened.
Check.1
Those issues were on research and policy agendas four decades ago
for several reasons.2 Support for indeterminate sentencing and the rehabilitative aims said to underlie it had collapsed. Efforts were afoot to ﬁgure out what should come next. Retributivism was the leading candidate:
punishment should be based mostly or entirely on offenders’ blameworthiness, on what they “deserved.” Among politicians—much less among
scholars—an approach based on instrumental goals of deterrence and
incapacitation was a leading candidate and had very different implications. Comparably blameworthy offenders could and should be treated
differently if punishing one more severely than another would prevent
crime more effectively.
Neither approach entirely won out. Retributivism was more inﬂuential in some times and places, consequentialism in others.3 In practice,
both approaches were inﬂuential and had to be reconciled. The normative literature on prediction of dangerousness considered how that might
be done. Agreement quickly emerged among most legal scholars and philosophers, and many practitioners, that the offender’s blameworthiness
1
These issues were widely discussed (e.g., Morris 1974; Hoffman 1983, 1995; Monahan
1983; Morris and Miller 1985; von Hirsch 1985; Tonry 1987).
2
Sources concerning intellectual and policy developments discussed in this introduction are well known. Tonry (2016, chap. 1) provides them.
3
This is the term most often used in contemporary writing by philosophers and legal
theorists to describe teleological punishment theories. Until a few decades ago, utilitarianism was in common use. Instrumentalism is a third, less commonly used alternative. The
key point is that, whatever the term used, punishment is seen as a means, not an end, and
must ﬁnd justiﬁcation in its beneﬁcial effects. Deontological retributivism, by contrast,
treats punishment as an end in itself. The only just punishment is a deserved punishment.
Effects do not matter.
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TABLE 1
US Parole Board, Salient Factors
1973 Version

1976 Version

1991 Version

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Convictions
Incarcerations
Age at ﬁrst commitment
Age at current commitment
Recent commitment-free period
Not auto theft
Not check fraud
No parole revoke, offense on parole
Custody status
No drug dependence
Education
Employment
Family
SOURCE.—Hoffman (1976, 1983, 1995).

should set an absolute upper limit on punishment’s severity; some argued
that consequentialist considerations were irrelevant and others that they
might be relevant but only if proportionate retributive upper limits were
respected. Conservative social scientists and many policy makers were
primarily interested in effective crime prevention.
Gradually, through the mid-1980s, something close to a consensus
view emerged of how retributive and consequentialist views of the role
of prediction could be reconciled. The evolution of the US Parole
Commission’s “Salient Factor Score,” used in its release guidelines, is illustrative (see table 1).
1. Only violence matters. The initial scoring system included a record
of auto theft convictions as an aggravating factor that, if present,
would delay release. This made sense if the goal was to predict any
future offense, including minor ones, since low-level property offenders often accumulate lengthy records. The commission decided that only risks of future violence could justify lengthier prison
sentences. The auto theft factor was dropped. The addition and removal of a check fraud factor illustrate the same point.
2. Racial disparities matter. The initial system included “age at ﬁrst
commitment” as a factor because it is a predictor of later offending.
The commission soon recognized, however, that ages at ﬁrst com-
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mitment were typically younger for blacks than for whites, partly
because of racial differences in how police respond to young
people’s behavior. Use of age at ﬁrst commitment as an aggravating factor meant that black offenders were held longer in prison
than whites. The factor was dropped. The discussion below of social disadvantage factors illustrates the same point.
3. Social disadvantage matters. The initial system included education,
employment, and family stability as factors because weak educational and employment records and unstable residential and family circumstances are predictors of later offending. The commission gradually recognized that use of these factors meant that more
privileged people would be held in prison for shorter periods than
disadvantaged people, who seldom in any meaningful sense choose
to be poor, badly educated, or erratically employed or to live chaotic lives. Larger percentages of minority than white people live
deeply disadvantaged lives; the socioeconomic factors increased
racial disparities. They were all dropped.
The literature on ethical and legal issues in prediction dried up after
the 1980s and has revived only in the 2010s. It dried up because the “tough
on crime” movement matured in the mid-1980s. Mandatory minimum sentence, three-strikes, truth in sentencing, life without parole, and similar
laws shifted the crime prevention focus from decisions by judges and parole
boards in individual cases to extended conﬁnement of whole categories of
offenders deﬁned only by the offenses of which they were convicted. Parole release was abandoned in a third of the states, made available only to
people convicted of minor crimes in the 26 states that enacted truth in
sentencing laws, fundamentally compromised by mandatory minimum,
three-strikes, and life without parole laws, and where it remained available was granted much less often by politically risk-averse parole boards.
Explanations of why a literature on prediction of dangerousness has reemerged are more speculative. Correctional managers for three decades
have been developing prediction instruments for use in classifying offenders for treatment and transferring offenders between programs. A
private-sector industry has developed that long made its money by selling
prediction instruments to correctional managers and, in recent years, has
begun selling its products to courts for use in pretrial detention, sentencing, and probation revocation proceedings. Companies found new markets partly because of mass incarceration and efforts to diminish it. Starting
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with the reentry movement of the late 1990s, reformers emphasized the
need to reduce recidivism rates, divert low-level and low-risk offenders
from imprisonment, and reserve imprisonment for serious and violent
offenders. Partly as a result, legislatures increasingly direct judges to take
reoffending predictions into account in making sentencing decisions,
sentencing commissions are building risk predictions into their guidelines, and courts are buying and using prediction instruments.
Predictions of dangerousness in our time present the same challenges
and raise the same normative and policy issues as they did three decades
ago. Eric Holder (2014) warned the US Sentencing Commission against
using dangerousness predictions when he was attorney general and has repeatedly decried their use since.4 Increased use of prediction instruments
has attracted the attention of legal scholars and social scientists. The development of “big data” approaches to prediction has attracted the interest of
statisticians who have extensively debated trade-offs between technical and
ethical issues. Social scientists have been patiently working on development, reﬁnement, and evaluation of correctional prediction instruments
since the 1980s.
The normative and policy issues raised by use in sentencing of predictions of dangerousness are back on the table. The 1970s and 1980s debates
about the same issues have largely been forgotten. In this essay I examine
the fundamental issues. Following the lead of the US Parole Commission
in the 1970s and 1980s, I focus on predictions of violent and otherwise serious crime. Reoffending is so common among chronic property, drug,
prostitution, and public disorder offenders that use of predictive incapacitation strategies would generate palpably unjust punishments.5 Blumstein,

4
Holder’s critique identiﬁes many of the problems discussed in this essay: “By basing
sentencing decisions on static factors and immutable characteristics—like the defendant’s
education level, socioeconomic background, or neighborhood—[risk assessments] may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already far too common in our criminal justice system and in our society. Criminal sentences must be based on the facts, the
law, the actual crimes committed, the circumstances surrounding each individual case, and
the defendant’s history of criminal conduct. They should not be based on unchangeable
factors that a person cannot control, or on the possibility of a future crime that has not
taken place.” He communicated his views to the US Sentencing Commission (letter, Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Director, Ofﬁce of Policy and Legislation, US Department of Justice,
to the Honorable Patti Saris, Chair, US Sentencing Commission, July 29, 2014).
5
Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik (2017), both former chairs of England’s Sentencing Advisory Panel, argue that chronic minor offenders should normally receive reduced sentences because their offending patterns signal the presence of fundamental social
maladjustment, mental health problems, or serious personality disorders.
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Farrington, and Moitra (1985) long ago showed that the probability of a
subsequent arrest exceeds 90 percent for anyone who has been arrested
eight or more times. Section I provides an overview of the current debates.
To a large extent they consist of people talking past each other. Section II
canvasses familiar objections to use of predictions of dangerousness in sentencing, including their inaccuracy; their reliance on ascribed characteristics such as age and gender;6 their use of status characteristics such as education, marital status, and employment; and their reliance on criminal
history indicators that are based in large part on discriminatory police
practices. All of these characteristics of contemporary prediction methods
systematically disadvantage poor and minority offenders relative to more
privileged and white offenders.
Section III addresses justiﬁcations offered for predictive sentencing. One
is that normative considerations related to punishment are too contested,
unrealistic, or indeterminate to guide real-world decisions. Another is that
racial, ethnic, age, and gender disparities caused by predictions are not troubling because they reﬂect real differences between groups. A third is that
predictive sentencing raises issues indistinguishable from public health
quarantines and use of actuarial predictions in medicine, public health,
credit scoring, and insurance. A fourth is that predictive sentencing is an
essential tool for minimization of crime.
In the ﬁnal section, I show diverse ways competing claims and aspirations can be reconciled. The realpolitik claim is that predictions will be
used one way or another, that crime is too emotional a topic for rational
argument and analyses to be relevant, and, accordingly, that there is no
point in explaining why predictive sentencing is unjust. I disagree with all
those propositions. Better that ofﬁcials treating other human beings unjustly be reminded again and again that that is what they are doing. Someday they may want and decide to do better.
That is not an unworldly aspiration. Conventional beliefs change. Some
American southerners before the Civil War and during the Jim Crow period opposed racial discrimination on moral grounds. Theirs eventually
became the prevailing view. Early feminists and sympathizers, notably in-

6
Changes in gender self-identiﬁcation are more common or more often declared in our
time than in earlier times. They remain relatively rare, however. In the text, I use “gender”
in its traditional bimodal sense. Inevitably, however, the issue will be raised in individual
cases in which gender attributions matter whether individuals may or must be categorized
according to birth-identiﬁed or self-identiﬁed gender (including none).
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cluding Mary Wollstonecraft ([1792] 2009) and John Stuart Mill ([1869]
1997), argued, again against the odds, that subordination of women is
wrong. That became the prevailing view. Consensual homosexual behavior remained a criminal offense in England until 1967 and in some American states until 2003. That is unimaginable now. Other countries’ criminal
law systems are committed to ideas of proportionality and equal treatment
that leave little room for predictive sentencing (e.g., in Scandinavia; LappiSeppälä 2016). That may someday happen in the United States.
A critic might accuse me of being insensitive to the suffering of victims of
crimes that would be avoided if their assailants had been incapacitated. I am
not. Prevention of foreseeable harms, however, requires trade-offs between
interests and costs. There is no cost-free way entirely to prevent many bad
things—including crimes, automobile injuries and fatalities, occupational
injuries, environmental degradation, and slips in bathtubs—from happening. No one is prepared to forbid use of automobiles, industrial production,
or bathing. Instead we try to make activities as safe as they affordably can be
while acknowledging their importance.
Crime is no different. There would be little violent crime in the community if all males between ages 16 and 30 were locked up; that is not going to
happen. Human beings value their liberty and autonomy too much. Incapacitation resulting from predictions of dangerousness diminishes the liberty and autonomy of knowable individual people, disproportionately poor
and disadvantaged ones, in exchange for predicted prevention of crimes to
hypothetical future victims. Because the world changes, many predicted
crimes may never have happened. Rates of violent crime, for example, declined by two-thirds in the past quarter century. Two-thirds of the crimes
that were predicted as grounds for locking people up in 1995 did not happen, but those locked up lost much of their lives as free citizens. The tradeoff is thus between punishing speciﬁc people much more than they deserve
in order, on the basis of predictions that are much more often than not incorrect, to prevent an unknowable number of future crimes. That price,
like the costs associated with banning private use of automobiles, is too
high. Violent crimes are as much an inevitable fact of life as auto accidents.
They are prices we pay for personal freedom.

I. The State of the Debates
People’s views about use of predictions of dangerousness in sentencing
sometimes appear to be irreconcilable, as two high-proﬁle exchanges
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demonstrate. Hart, Michie, and Cooke (2007) evaluated use of several
well-known instruments and concluded that the “group and individual
risk estimates” they produce are too wide to be useful. The predictions
are too often wrong, they said; using them does serious unjustiﬁable
harm to individuals who would not have been violent. Statisticians Peter
Imrey and Philip Dawid (2015) responded, insisting that the best-known
instruments, their results, and their applications are based on sound statistical practice.
Imrey and Dawid did not understand, or pretended not to understand,
the critics’ objection. Individuals are not treated unjustly, they wrote:
decisions are “individualized.” A judge saying that would mean that he
or she took into account all available information concerning a particular
individual and thought carefully about what to do. What Imrey and
Dawid meant was different: “individualized risk [is] derived from an external group and projected onto the subject” (2015, p. 39). That is, the
riskiness attributed to an individual is not his or her own, but the average
of a group in which he or she is included for purposes of statistical analyses. They distinguished this from “latent individual risk intrinsic to the
subject herself.” This, though obscurely phrased, is what most people
mean when they say that a decision about a speciﬁc person is individualized.
The second exchange began when Angwin et al. (2016) analyzed
Broward County, Florida, data on use of COMPAS, a proprietary prediction instrument licensed by a for-proﬁt company.7 Their title tells
their conclusion: “There’s Software Used across the Country to Predict
Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks.” Their three key ﬁndings:
blacks had higher average risk scores than whites, relatively more blacks
than whites were wrongly predicted to be violent (exposing relatively more
7
Dressel and Farid (2018) report on a stunning analysis of 462 laypeople’s predictions
of dangerousness, using the Broward County, Florida, data set used by Flores, Bechtel, and
Lowenkamp (2016), and ﬁnd that laypeople’s predictions of reoffending were as accurate
as COMPAS’s. Dressel and Farid presented short descriptions of the crimes with which
1,000 defendants were charged and (only) the defendant’s sex, age, and previous criminal
history. COMPAS, by contrast, uses 137 variables. In order to prevent participant exhaustion, defendants were divided into 20 sets of 50 cases. Each participant was asked for one
defendant set to predict reoffending within 2 years of the defendant’s most recent crime. In
one round of questioning, participants were not given the defendant’s race. In a second
round, they were (for a different set of offenders than in the ﬁrst round). The participants
were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online crowd-sourcing marketplace in which people are paid to perform a wide variety of tasks. The participants’
predictions in both rounds were as accurate as COMPAS’s. Racial differences in false positive rates were lower than in Flores, Bechtel, and Lowenkamp’s analysis.
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black people to harsher treatment), and relatively fewer blacks than whites
were wrongly predicted to be nonviolent (making fewer eligible for milder
treatment). Those foreseeable racial disparities—crucially important to
people they affect—are what the critics meant by “bias.”
Flores, Bechtel, and Lowenkamp (2016) did not refute the racial disparity ﬁndings but insisted that the critics had not shown statistical bias. Blacks
have higher crime rates than whites, they explained, and more often have
socioeconomic and other characteristics correlated with offending: no
bias, just sound statistical practice. They sidestepped the critics’ objections.
Talented, passionate people were on both sides of those exchanges but
could not ﬁnd common ground. The prediction defenders viewed the
issues as primarily technical: let the chips fall where they may. The critics
viewed the issues as primarily substantive: knowingly treating blacks more
harshly than whites is wrong.
Many fault lines permeate prediction debates. Some consider it irresponsible not to use state-of-the-art prediction methods. Others believe
that punishments should be closely proportioned to offenders’ blameworthiness and that it is unjust to punish some offenders more severely than
others only because of predictions. Still others believe that reducing use
of imprisonment depends on identifying offenders likeliest to reoffend,
and locking them up, so that others need not be. Some people believe that
racial, ethnic, and class disparities caused and exacerbated by prediction
instruments are morally wrong and want them to end.
In writing the preceding paragraphs, I tried to avoid polemic. The facts,
ma’am, just the facts, as Sergeant Joe Friday used to say. I did not mention
assertions that political and ideological agendas and racial, ethnic, and class
biases, conscious and implicit, underlay adoption in the United States of
broad-based incapacitative crime control policies in the 1980s and 1990s,
including increased use of prediction. Those allegations may be true, but
here I set them aside. My interest is in the intellectual challenge posed
by widely different, good-faith, views about prediction, and whether and
how they can be reconciled.
The difﬁculty, as Isaiah Berlin (2002) long ago explained, is that the
implications of equally valid ﬁrst principles often conﬂict. Few would
disagree that maintenance of public order and security is a Good Thing.
Were that the only relevant consideration, it would be self-evident that
efforts to diminish crime’s effects on victims should be maximized.
Other no less important values, however, are at stake. If assuring that
offenders be punished precisely as much as they deserve were all that
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mattered, predictions about future offending would be irrelevant. If only
equal treatment mattered, people convicted of equally serious crimes
should be punished equally severely; predictions would again be irrelevant.
If avoidance of policies that cause or aggravate racial and ethnic disparities,
or that rely on factors tinged with invidious bias, was overridingly important, all existing prediction systems would have to be abandoned.
The values underlying all of those things matter, and they conﬂict. People resolve the conﬂicts in different ways. Some allow one goal to trump
others (e.g., reducing mass incarceration by using imprisonment only for
“dangerous” people: Flores, Bechtel, and Lowenkamp 2016; reducing social and racial injustice: Harcourt 2008; preventing crime: Slobogin 2019).
Imrey and Dawid (2015, p. 40), in an article sometimes described as the
leading statistical work on actuarial risk assessment, observe, “If groups
of individuals with high and low propensities for violence recidivism can
be distinguished, and courts act upon such distinctions, recidivism will decline to the extent that groups most prone to violence are incapacitated. . . .
And both society and offenders will be better served even if we cannot be
sure . . . from precisely which individual offenders this betterment derives.”
Offenders who are imprisoned, or held longer, because they were mistakenly predicted to be violent, however, are seldom likely to agree that they
have been “better served.”
Some writers acknowledge the problem but take no position. When
writing about punishment theory generally, American philosopher Douglas Husak (2019a) observes, “Sentencing according to the principle of
proportionality is crucial if the state is to treat offenders as they deserve.”
However, concerning risk prediction, he adopts a “pluralist” stance and
writes, “Retributivists should preserve the role of desert while weakening its strength. . . . We can preserve proportionality but allow exceptions when we have a good rationale for them. . . . If we have good
reason to inﬂict different amounts of punishment on two offenders who
have committed equally serious crimes, we should not be worried that
our decision does not preserve proportionality. Admittedly, the results
produced [may be] messy; sentencing, like morality more generally, is
not governed by an algorithm” (Husak 2019b).8 English philosopher
Matt Matravers (2019, p. 205) offers an account of punishment in which

8
The newest and purportedly most accurate prediction devices employing big data and
machine learning are algorithms (Berk et al. 2018; Berk 2019).
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censure of blameworthy behavior and crime prevention are independent
governing principles: “The results may well be counter-intuitive,” he
writes, to punish people convicted of less serious crimes more severely than
people convicted of more serious ones, but “it is not inconsistent” so long
as retributive and consequentialist goals are independent. The problem,
which he does not explore, is in deciding what to do when the implications
of the independent principles conﬂict.
Not everyone sidesteps. Psychologists John Monahan and Jennifer
Skeem (2016) survey the literature, work through all the major problems,
and propose ways to limit unwanted effects of prediction (notably by allowing them to be used to reduce but not to increase sentence severity).9
Berk et al. (2018, p. 1) in one of a series of increasingly subtle analyses of
trade-offs between ethical issues and predictive accuracy, observe, “Except in trivial cases, it is impossible to maximize accuracy and fairness
at the same time, and impossible simultaneously to satisfy all kinds of fairness.” However, they too throw up their hands: “In the end, it will fall to
stakeholders—not criminologists, not statisticians, and not computer
scientists—to determine the tradeoffs. . . . These are matters of values
and law, and ultimately, the political process” (p. 33). Not terribly helpful
or reassuring to anyone concerned about unjust treatment of individuals.
The political process produced mass incarceration and three-strikes, life
without parole, and similar laws.

II. The Indictment
Three sets of problems bedevil use of predictions in sentencing. The ﬁrst
is that they are seldom very accurate. When the aim is to predict serious
sexual or other violence, more predictions are wrong (“false positives”)
than are right (“true positives”). If used to determine prison sentence
lengths, many people who would not have committed serious violence
will be held longer. The second set of problems concerns the variables
used in nearly all prediction instruments: some over which individuals
have no control, such as age and gender, are fundamentally unjust; some
concern inherently personal matters such as marriage, work, and education; some relate to aspects of criminal records that are contaminated by
9
This does not, however, reduce racial and class disparities. Minority and lower–social
class offenders systematically score worse on risk prediction instruments and are thus less
likely to beneﬁt from mitigated sentences predicated on “good” risk scores.
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conscious and implicit bias and discriminatory practices. The third set
concerns racial and ethnic disparities; almost all variables used in prediction instruments correlate with race and ethnicity and inexorably make
punishments of minority group members harsher than those of whites.

A. Accuracy
Violence is rare, even among known offenders. Predicting rare events
accurately is inherently difﬁcult. As a result, the technology of violence
prediction is not very good. The predictions are more often inaccurate
than accurate. I was astonished to learn, when reviewing the contemporary literature as background for writing this essay, that accuracy is little
better now than it was four decades ago.
Norval Morris (1974), in an inﬂuential early synthesis, concluded that
predictions of future violence were wrong two-thirds of the time. The
most exhaustive contemporaneous analysis by John Monahan (1981)
reached the same conclusion. Predictions that people will not be violent
were overwhelmingly correct, but that is trivial: if only 10 percent are
violent, a prediction that no one will commit a violent crime will be correct 90 percent of the time. Morris argued that then-current knowledge
did not justify imposing longer prison terms on people predicted to be
violent: “ ‘Dangerousness’ must be rejected for this purpose, since it presupposes a capacity to predict future criminal behavior quite beyond
our present technical ability” (1974, p. 62). Locking up three people
predicted to be violent when only one will be, he said, is deeply unjust.
Two would be wrongfully deprived of extended periods of liberty.
Analyses of prediction studies conventionally distinguish, as Morris
did, between true and false positives. True positives are predicted to
reoffend, and do. False positives are predicted to reoffend, but do not.
True and false negatives are deﬁned similarly. In Morris’s time, the state
of the predictive art, as table 2 shows using Morris’s example, was that
two-thirds of individuals predicted to be violent were false positives.
The technology of violence prediction is vastly more sophisticated
than it was four decades ago. The early studies were based on clinical predictions by doctors, mental health specialists, judges, and correctional
personnel. The contemporary literature is actuarial and is based on mathematical models, sophisticated statistical analyses, machine learning, and
“big data.” One might expect that violence predictions today would be
vastly more accurate than in the 1970s. They aren’t.
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TABLE 2
Violence Prediction, True and False Positives
and Negatives: An Illustration
Crime Type

Prediction

Result—No Violence

Result—Violence

No violence

70

65 (true negatives)

5 (false negatives)

Violence

30

20 (false positives)

100

85

Total

10 (true positives)
15

SOURCE.—Adapted from Morris (1974, table 1).

One leading meta-analysis of the accuracy of prediction instruments
concludes that further improvements are unlikely: “After almost ﬁve
decades of developing risk prediction tools, the evidence increasingly
suggests that the ceiling of predictive efﬁcacy may have been reached
with the available technology” (Yang, Wong, and Coid 2010, p. 759).
Consistently with this caution, two major meta-analyses conclude that
the most commonly used violence prediction instruments are indistinguishable in their accuracy.10
The most inﬂuential meta-analysis, analyzing research on the nine most
commonly used instruments, concluded that positive violence predictions
are, on average, correct 42 percent of the time (Fazel et al. 2012; Fazel
2019). Morris, recall, was troubled that only one-third of positive predictions (two of six) were correct. Forty-two percent accuracy, put differently,
means that two of ﬁve positive predictions are correct. As in Morris’s time,
substantially more than half of people predicted to be violent will not be.
Two of the leading meta-analyses conclude that positive predictions
of future violence are too inaccurate to be used in sentencing:
Because of their moderate level of predictive efﬁcacy, they should not
be used as the sole or primary means for clinical or criminal justice
10
Yang, Wong, and Coid (2010, p. 759): “If prediction of violence is the only criterion
for the selection of a risk assessment tool, then the tools included in the present study are
essentially interchangeable.” Campbell, French, and Gendreau (2009, p. 253): “This analysis found little difference among the predictive validities of actuarial and structured
instruments for violent reoffending.” Meta-analyses of research on instruments used to
predict any, as opposed to only violent, reoffending reach the same conclusion: “Overall,
no one instrument stood out as producing more accurate assessments than the others, with
validity varying with the indicator reported” (Desmarais, Johnson, and Singh 2016, p. 213).
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decision making that is contingent on a high level of predictive accuracy,
such as preventive detention. (Yang, Wong, and Coid 2010, p. 761)
These tools are not sufﬁcient on their own for the purposes of risk
assessment. . . . The current level of evidence is not sufﬁciently strong
for deﬁnitive decisions on sentencing, parole, and release or discharge
to be made solely using these tools. (Fazel et al. 2012, pp. 5, 6)
Even outspoken defenders of risk prediction agree. Flores, Bechtel,
and Lowenkamp (2016, p. 39), whom I discussed above concerning disagreements about racial bias, emphasized that “we want to make it clear
that we are not supporting or endorsing the idea of using risk assessment
at sentencing.”
There is thus no credible scientiﬁc case to be made in favor of use in
sentencing of predictions of future violence.
B. Unjust Variables
Except for race and, though they are seldom explicitly discussed, presumably also ethnicity, nationality, and religion, developers of prediction
instruments include as variables any offense and offender characteristics
on which they can obtain data. In other public policy settings, for example, education, public health, and medical research, equivalent strategies
including use even of racial and other usually verboten data make sense.
The aims are to improve public services generally, to understand and address problems affecting subpopulations, or to diagnose and treat individual health problems.
Violence prediction in courts is different.11 The aim is usually to identify high-risk individuals for pretrial or postconviction preventive detention (though as Monahan [2017] argues, it could in theory be used to
identify low-risk individuals for more humane treatment; I discuss this
below). Public health and educational research and related policies seldom target individuals. Medical decision making does, but the aim is to
11
Different considerations may be pertinent concerning some uses of prediction instruments in correctional settings. Some “culturally appropriate” treatment programs, e.g.,
target special needs of women or members of speciﬁc minority groups. Other treatment
programs target “higher-risk” offenders on the efﬁciency rationale that low-risk offenders will
usually not reoffend whether or not they participate. Prediction instruments are used to match
offenders to treatment programs generally, to set or vary treatment or supervision intensity,
and to measure changes relative to program goals. They are also used in institutional custodylevel decisions, which may raise issues similar to those concerning sentencing.
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attempt to prevent or minimize human suffering. Sentencing decisions
are intended to cause human suffering. That is why Jeremy Bentham
called all punishment, even when warranted, “evil.”
Suspect variables fall into three categories. Race, gender, and age
ought to be off-limits because they are basic human characteristics for
which individuals bear no causal, personal, or moral responsibility. Increased punishments for any of these reasons are per se unjust. A host
of socioeconomic characteristics including employment, education, marital status, living arrangements, and parental responsibilities are correlated
with offending but are not the criminal law’s business. These are matters of
individual choice in a free society. Punishing people for making the
“wrong” choices is also per se unjust. Socioeconomic and other personal
characteristics including many related to criminal history are highly correlated with race and ethnicity; many are shaped by invidious discrimination. Their use causes and exacerbates adverse racial and ethnic disparities.

C. Immutable Characteristics
No one would think people should be punished more severely because
of their eye or hair color or adult height, characteristics over which they
have no control. Gender, race and ethnicity, and age raise the same issue.
So, despite their greater mutability, would religion and nationality most
of the time.
1. Age. Individuals have no more control of their age than of their
eye color. Mentally responsible individuals do have control over their
behavior. All else being equal, the age of an offender should not matter,
except to mitigate the severity of punishments imposed on young and
elderly offenders.12 Young offenders in all Western countries, including
the United States, have traditionally been punished less severely than
adults and usually in specialized courts using specialized procedures
and imposing less severe punishments.13
12
Many European countries have created strong legal presumptions against imprisonment of the elderly (typically, 70 or older). That is why former Italian Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi was sentenced to community service as a hospital orderly rather than
to the multiyear prison sentence he would otherwise have received following conviction
for public corruption offenses. As the Madoff Ponzi scheme and Bill Cosby cases and
the reluctance of most American prisons to release terminally ill and elderly prisoners
demonstrate, the United States, as in many penal policy matters, is an outlier.
13
In western European countries, e.g., the age of criminal responsibility is typically 14
or 15 years (in Belgium 18 for most offenses). In most, waiver of young offenders to adult
courts is not legally possible; nor is direct prosecution in adult courts. In German courts,
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The reasons are self-evident. Most young offenders are less experienced
and mature than most adults, are at a developmental stage during which risk
taking, thrill seeking, and experimentation are common, and are more malleable. Research on “age/crime curves” and desistance has long shown
that many adolescents commit crimes as teenagers, but most soon desist
(Farrington [1986] and Laub and Sampson [2001] are the classic sources).
Neurological and developmental research of the last two decades has documented details of adolescent brain development and behavioral controls
that strengthen the rationale for more forgiving handling of young offenders (Monahan, Steinberg, and Piquero 2015). Even the conservative
US Supreme Court is convinced. Banning mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles, it emphasized that “children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing” and that “mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentence from taking account of an
offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it” (Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 [2012]).
Nonetheless, youth is widely used as a variable in prediction instruments
and as an aggravating factor in sentencing. I discuss Virginia’s notorious
sentencing guidelines, in use for more than 25 years, because they are premised on prediction-based incapacitation. They call for, all else being equal,
harsher punishments for younger than for older offenders. This is wrong in
principle and, in light of a growing body of research showing that imprisonment is criminogenic, perverse (e.g., Nagin, Cullen, and Lero Jonson
2009).
The Virginia guidelines set out criteria that identify nonviolent offenders for whom prison sentences are speciﬁed but whom judges are encouraged to divert to community-based punishments. In fraud guidelines,
22 “points” are given for being aged 20 or younger (Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission 2014).14 Being male adds 10 more points, for a total of
32. Only offenders who receive 31 or fewer points qualify for diversion;
thus no matter how minor the offense or the criminal record, all males under 21 fail to satisfy the diversion criteria.
Virginia’s remarkable treatment of young people becomes starker when
compared with provisions for offenders 30 and over; they receive 7 “age

the vast majority of 18- and 19-year-olds convicted of serious crimes are sentenced as if
they were juveniles (Tonry and Chambers 2012).
14
The details are slightly different for larceny. Being male adds 9, not 10, points. The
system is otherwise similar.
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points.” Five points are given for having one or two prior felony convictions and 4 points for having been incarcerated as an adult one to nine
times. Put it together: A 30-year-old (7 points) male (10) with two prior
felony convictions (5) and two prior adult incarcerations (4) totals 26 points
and falls below the 31-point diversion threshold. An 18-year-old with no
past criminal record does not.
There are three explanations for this strange policy. First, Virginia’s
guidelines were developed at the height of the “tough-on-crime” period
under the administration of Republican Governor George Allen, who
ran for ofﬁce on a “parole abolition” platform (Tonry 2016). They were
developed under the leadership of former US Attorney General William
Barr, author while in ofﬁce of the 1992 tract The Case for More Incarceration
(1992). Second, selective incapacitation long before had been repudiated as
a crime control strategy by the National Academy of Sciences (Blumstein
et al. 1986), but Barr nonetheless made incapacitation the premise for the
Virginia guidelines. Third, because of the age/crime curve, age is a powerful predictor of future offending (though most offenses involve property or
drugs and most young offenders soon desist).
The more general question is whether youth should be included in any
prediction instrument meant to be used, or that might be used, in deciding whom to imprison or for how long. The trade-off is between predictive accuracy and punishing people because they are young. If the tradeoff concerned eye color, race, or religion, few people would consider it.
Even if any of them predicted reoffending, basic requirements of justice
forbid their use. Age is equally inappropriate.
2. Gender. Gender cuts in different directions in different contexts. Assiduous efforts are made in education, employment, and public health to
prevent or minimize differential treatment of women. This is so even when
actuarial rationales exist. Because they typically live longer than men,
women traditionally paid lower life insurance premiums but also received
lower monthly pension beneﬁts. Those practices have been attacked as unjust, increasingly successfully, despite their actuarial justiﬁcations. So have
higher automobile insurance premiums paid by men.
The early American sentencing commissions undertook research on
past sentencing patterns and invariably found that women typically received less severe punishments than men. No commission, however,
chose to promulgate separate, less severe guidelines for women or to
make gender a mitigating factor. Gender-blind guidelines were expected
to increase sentence severity for women, but everyone involved agreed
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that was required by respect for gender equality (e.g., Knapp 1984; Tonry
1996).
Gender blindness is a powerful idea. Treating people differently because they are male or female is wrong in the same way that treating people differently because they are of a particular race or religion is wrong.
Gender blindness is sometimes set aside for sympathetic policy reasons.
Examples targeting women include health care, maternity leaves, ﬂexible
work schedules, and help with child care. Even with such policies, movements are afoot as a matter of fairness to make comparable provision for
men. What distinguishes these gender-conscious policies is that they
aim to do something for women, not to them. They do not aim to treat
men worse but to meet gender-speciﬁc needs of women.
That has not stopped developers of prediction instruments from incorporating maleness as a factor. Nor has it stopped policy makers from
using maleness, all else being equal, to increase punishment severity.
The 10 points given under the Virginia fraud guidelines for being male
(compared with 1 point for being female) is an example. Theft and drug
sale guidelines vary in detail, but all treat men and women differently.
The rationale is actuarial. Across crime, time, and country, men’s offending rates are higher than women’s. Locking up more otherwise comparable men than women will predictably prevent more future offenses.
Just as with eye color, race, ethnicity, and age, however, that cannot justify
punishing some equally culpable offenders more severely than others.
3. Race and Ethnicity. No American jurisdiction explicitly authorizes
use of race or ethnicity (or religion or nationality) as criteria for making
sentencing or parole release decisions. Doing so would violate long-settled
constitutional equal protection doctrines (e.g., Starr 2014). Indirectly,
however, race and ethnicity creep in when decisions are based in part
on socioeconomic and criminal history variables that are correlated with
them. On average, black and Hispanic Americans compared with whites
have lower incomes, weaker employment records, less extensive educations, less residential stability, and more extensive criminal records. All
are correlated with higher offending risks. This is one major reason why
prediction instruments produce higher false positive rates for blacks than
for whites and higher false negative rates for whites than for blacks.
A strong argument can be made, persuasive to many, that there is no
moral difference between making invidious decisions on the basis of race
and knowing that making decisions based on other considerations will
affect members of different racial groups differently. If a law specifying
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5-year prison sentences for black offenders and 2-year sentences for
whites is wrong, why isn’t it equally wrong to use prediction instruments
that foreseeably produce the same result? This argument is why criminal
law mens rea doctrine usually treats intention to cause a harm, knowledge
that the harm will almost certainly result, and reckless disregard of a substantial and justiﬁable risk that it will occur as morally equivalent. Doing
something knowing it will cause harm is little different from doing
something intending to cause harm.
The legal and moral issues this argument raises are complex, but that
does not weaken its force in relation to sentencing and punishment.
There are other circumstances in which knowingly causing harm is justiﬁed. Criminal law defenses of self-defense, duress, and necessity provide
examples. So does the Roman Catholic moral doctrine of double effect,
which justiﬁes harms that are side effects of actions taken to accomplish
a good result (McIntyre 2014; an example: acting to save a pregnant
woman’s life though a fetus will likely die). Other times harms occur for
which there is no remedy. The US Supreme Court famously decided that
public authorities may not operate segregated schools on purpose (de jure
discrimination) but segregated schools that are the outgrowth of residential patterns (de facto discrimination) are okay.
Criminal punishment is different from the harms involved in those
other contexts. Sentences imposed by courts are state actions that are indisputably meant to cause pain to offenders. No decent person would say
that black people convicted of a particular offense deserve to suffer greater
pain than do white offenders convicted of the same offense. We know,
judges know, designers of instruments know that use of predictions of
dangerousness in sentencing causes black offenders to be punished more
severely than white offenders convicted of the same offenses. We also
know, though less conﬁdently, that decision makers more often override
risk predictions of black than white offenders and punish them even more
severely than their individual risk classiﬁcation would justify (Green and
Chen 2019). Thus, a double whammy: black offenders are overpredicted
to be violent and are then punished more severely than the prediction,
even if correct, would call for.
Table 3, showing false positive and false negative rates calculated by
Flores, Bechtel, and Lowenkamp (2016) in their reanalysis of COMPAS
data, illustrates this. Half of whites predicted not to reoffend were rearrested, compared with only 28 percent of blacks predicted not to reoffend. The false negative rate for whites was nearly double that for blacks.
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TABLE 3
Prediction Errors, Any Arrest within 2 Years, by Race: An Illustration

Whites
Blacks

False Positive Rates (%)

False Negative Rates (%)

22
42

50
28

SOURCE.—Flores, Bechtel, and Lowenkamp (2016, table 3).

Conversely, only 22 percent of whites who were predicted to reoffend did
not, compared with 42 percent of blacks. The false positive rate for blacks
was nearly twice that for whites. These are extraordinary differences. Blacks
are much more likely than whites to be mislabeled as dangerous and, if this
is reﬂected in sentencing, to be punished more severely than they otherwise
would be. Conversely, whites are much more likely than blacks to be
mislabeled as “not dangerous” and, if this is reﬂected in sentencing, to beneﬁt from a mistaken prediction that they would not reoffend.
Harcourt (2008) showed that predictive sentencing has a ratchet effect
that worsens racial and socioeconomic disparities. When risk predictions
are used, minority and disadvantaged defendants are treated more severely, on average, than others the ﬁrst time they are convicted. Each subsequent conviction has compounding effects and further increases increments of additional severity they suffer. Racial differences in criminal
history are a primary cause of racial disparities in imprisonment (Hester
et al. 2018).
Correlations between offending and race are not random. Both ofﬁcial
police data and victim survey data show that black people commit some
crimes at higher rates than whites. That is not surprising. In every country, members of some socially and economically disadvantaged groups
commit crimes at higher rates than the majority population (Tonry 1997).
In the United States, the social and economic disadvantages that disproportionately afﬂict black and Hispanic people, and are correlated with offending, are partly products of historical and ongoing discrimination and of
diminished life chances at birth. Mentally responsible minority offenders,
like other offenders, should be punished as they deserve for the offenses
they commit; few people disagree.15 It should be at least discomforting,
however, that the use of prediction instruments in sentencing exacerbates
the effects of disadvantage and causes many minority offenders to be
punished more harshly than they deserve or would be if they were white.
15
Minority and deeply disadvantaged offenders may, however, often deserve less severe
punishments than do others (Tonry 2014).
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D. Socioeconomic Characteristics
All of the early sentencing commissions rejected use of socioeconomic
variables in their sentencing guidelines systems. The ﬁrst principle set
out in the “Statement of Purpose and Principles” of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (1980) provided, and still does, “Sentencing should be neutral with respect to the race, gender, social, or economic status of convicted offenders.” Section 994(d) of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 directs the federal sentencing commission to “assure
that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race,
sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders.” Section
994(e) elaborates: “The Commission shall assure that the guidelines and
policy statements, in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of
a term of imprisonment, reﬂect the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.”
The US Congress and Minnesota’s sentencing commission rejected
use of socioeconomic characteristics in sentencing because using them
is unjust. It feels platitudinous to write this, but it is unchallengeably
true: No one should be punished more severely than he would otherwise
be because he is rich or poor, well or inadequately educated, married or
single, working or unemployed. None of that has anything to do with an
individual human being’s blameworthiness. Even the Virginia Sentencing Commission, not renowned for its sensitivity to moral and ethical
issues, removed the socioeconomic factors—employment and marital
status—initially included in its diversion guidelines (Ostrom and Kauder
2012). The correlation of many socioeconomic characteristics with race
makes their use doubly unjust.16
There is another fundamental reason why socioeconomic characteristics
should not be cause for harsher punishment. Many result from legitimate
lifestyle choices that are not the state’s business. People living in free societies are entitled to decide whether to marry, to work a steady job, or to become well educated, even if being unmarried, lacking a stable work record,
and being poorly educated are correlated with higher offending rates. Free
citizens are entitled to decide to seek university degrees, join apprenticeship
programs, or live lawfully hand to mouth, as street people and many artists,
musicians, and writers do by some combination of choice and necessity.

16
The US Parole Commission was concerned for decades that use of socioeconomic
variables in its Salient Factor Score exacerbated racial injustices and, partly for that reason,
removed them (Hoffman 1976, 1983, 1995).
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Citizens are entitled to choose not to work at all and to live hand to mouth
or on income from trust funds or indulgent parents.
Committing violent and property crimes, selling illicit drugs, and actively participating in criminal gangs also reﬂect personal choices, but
they are choices of a different kind. So are choices by sentenced offenders
to violate lawful conditions imposed on community punishments, such as
compliance with curfews, desistance from crime, and not associating with
former criminal associates. Those behaviors are unlawful; people who engage in them assume risks of arrest, prosecution, conviction, and punishment. They choose to live dangerous lives.
Prediction instruments and sentencing policies that take account of
socioeconomic characteristics generally do so because research shows
them to be correlated with offending. A cynic might say that anyone who
chooses to live a vagabond life assumes the risk that he will be punished
for it, so what’s the problem? Many offenders, however, do not—in any
fundamental sense—choose to be poorly housed, poorly employed or unemployed, poorly educated, or unmarried. Even if poor people’s choices are
more constrained than more privileged people’s, they are lawful choices all
the same. Punishing people because of their lawful lifestyle choices raises
the same ethical issues for a disadvantaged inner-city resident as it would
for a privileged trust fund beneﬁciary.
Anyone who believes in equal justice should oppose use in sentencing
of race-skewing socioeconomic variables in sentencing generally, including in prediction instruments. That is why, more than 30 years ago, as table 1 shows, the US Parole Commission removed them from its prediction instrument even though that weakened the Salient Factor Score’s
accuracy (Hoffman 1983).
E. Criminal History
Criminal history raises more complex issues than is usually recognized,
despite widely held intuitions that prior convictions justify harsher punishments for subsequent offenses (Roberts 2008; Roberts and von Hirsch
2010). Although it appears self-evident to Americans that people who
have previously been convicted of crimes should be punished more severely for a new offense, all else being equal, it is not self-evident to people in other countries. In the Scandinavian countries, for example, the
general assumption is that punishments should not be increased because
of prior convictions (Asp 2010; Lappi-Seppälä 2011). The reasoning is
that the offender has already been punished as much as he or she deserved
for the former offense and should now be punished as much as is deserved
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for the new one. Prior convictions are often taken into account as aggravating factors in other common-law countries, but usually subject to
sharp limits (Baker and Ashworth 2010; Freiberg 2014).
American policy makers and practitioners are unlikely soon to adopt or
endorse the Scandinavian point of view and decide to take account of prior
records not at all or only a little. Criminal history does, however, have dramatic aggravating effects in American sentencing. Under three-strikes,
habitual offender, and career criminal laws, prior convictions make a huge
difference. Under state sentencing guidelines systems, criminal history can
result in sentences four to 15 times longer than are received by ﬁrst offenders (Hester et al. 2018). Any searching inquiry into ethical issues in
American sentencing would have to explore the rationales and justiﬁcations of those differences.
Criminal history variables are the primary drivers of risk predictions.
It is difﬁcult, however, to ﬁnd a principled justiﬁcation for increasing the
severity of punishment because of an individual’s criminal history. Even
if one could be found, criminal history is entangled with racial bias and
foreseeable disparate racial effects.
1. Punishment Theories. Retributivists believe that any punishment
more severe than an offender deserves is per se unjust. Immanuel Kant,
the archetypal retributivist, averred that punishment should be precisely
calibrated to the seriousness of the offense: “But what kind and what
amount of punishment is it that public justice makes its principle and measure? None other than the principle of equality (in the position of the needle on the scale of justice), to incline no more to one side than to the other.
Accordingly, whatever undeserved evil you inﬂict on another among the
people, that you [deserve]. . . . Only the law of retribution ( jus talionis) . . .
can specify deﬁnitely the quality and the quantity of punishment” ([1797]
2017, p. 115). This requires strict proportionality so that equally serious
crimes are punished equally severely, and more and less serious crimes are
punished appropriately differently. Almost all retributive philosophers and
criminal law theorists who have considered the matter conclude that there
is no convincing moral justiﬁcation for treating people with prior convictions more severely than ﬁrst-timers (e.g., Fletcher 1978; Lippke 2016).
Utilitarians and contemporary consequentialists should in principle permit harsher punishments for recidivists, but only if the reductions in suffering attributable to crimes thereby prevented are greater than the additional suffering imposed on offenders. Utilitarianism also has a strong
proportionality principle, based on a deterrence logic: punishments should
be scaled to offense seriousness to encourage offenders always to commit
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the less serious of alternative possible crimes. However, unlike retributive
proportionality, utilitarian proportionality can be trumped by a frugality
principle (Bentham’s term; in our time, we say parsimony) that forbids
unnecessary punishment. Bentham condemned and would forbid punishments that cause more suffering to offenders than their punishment prevents and punishments whose aims can more effectively be obtained by
means of other preventive measures (Frase 2009a). For Bentham, the archetypal utilitarian, any punishments more severe than concerns for utilitarian proportionality otherwise permit are per se wrong: “All punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. . . . If it ought at all to
be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude
some greater evil” ([1789] 1970, p. 158; my emphasis).
The problem in our time for consequentialist supporters of predictive
sentencing is that contemporary knowledge of deterrence, incapacitation (the rationale for prediction), and rehabilitation cannot “promise
to exclude some greater evil.” I have several times recently surveyed the
relevant literature (Tonry 2016, 2018a), as have many others (e.g., Chalﬁn
and McCrary 2017), including most notably the National Academy of
Sciences Committee on the Causes and Consequences of High Rates of
Incarceration (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014, chap. 5). That august
body concluded that deterrent and incapacitative effects of punishment are
modest at best and that imprisonment is on balance criminogenic, making
ex-prisoners more rather than less likely to reoffend. The evidence on rehabilitation is stronger. Well-designed, well-targeted, well-managed, and
well-funded programs can reduce reoffending (MacKenzie 2006). Assignment to diagnostically appropriate treatment programs does not, however,
require that individuals receive longer prison sentences.
2. Racial Bias and Disparate Effects. Even if punishment theories are
set aside, difﬁcult ethical issues relating to race and ethnicity remain.
Blacks more often commit and are more often arrested for violent crimes
than whites. In a system in which criminal history makes a big difference
in sentencing, even that facially plausible explanation for differences in
conviction rates means that criminal history factors disproportionately
affect blacks. Use of criminal history factors systematically disadvantages
members of minority groups. Frase (2009b), in the most comprehensive
study ever published on racial disparities in a state sentencing system,
found that two-thirds of racial disparities in Minnesota imprisonment
result from use of criminal history factors in sentencing.
Aspects of criminal history that are commonly included as variables in
prediction instruments—age at ﬁrst arrest or commitment, custody sta-
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tus, and numbers of prior arrests, convictions, and punishments—result
in substantial part from explicit and implicit racial bias and from conscious police targeting of poor and minority neighborhoods and individuals. Black and Hispanic people are arrested at younger ages and more
often than white people for reasons that have as much to do with racially
differentiated exercises of police discretion as with racial differences in
offending behavior.17
Police sometimes arrest more young black people for invidious
reasons but often would prefer to avoid arrests if they can. White and
middle-class young people, however, can be returned to stable homes
or referred to private treatment and mental health facilities more frequently than disadvantaged minority offenders. Schools refer more minority than white students to the police for conduct problems. Racial
proﬁling by the police by deﬁnition mostly affects members of minority
groups. Drug enforcement policies disproportionately target substances
sold by minority drug dealers and the places where they sell them (Fellner
2013). All of these practices exaggerate the criminal records of members
of minority groups compared with other people.
3. Other Criminal History Issues. Use of criminal history variables in
sentencing, or in prediction instruments, raises other issues. When the
sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code were being developed in
the 1950s, there was vigorous debate over whether criminal history should
ever be taken into account. Paul Tappan (1947), chairman of the US Parole Board, and primary draftsman of the code’s sentencing and corrections provisions, argued that with liberty at stake, only prior convictions
should count. Arrests or prosecutions not resulting in a conviction should
not. On the same logic, age at ﬁrst arrest or commitment, custody status,
prison commitments, all—along with arrests—commonly used as variables in prediction instruments, should not. Tappan’s view is the contemporary norm in other Western countries: Only convictions count (Roberts and von Hirsch 2010). Here I only ﬂag these issues. However, since
predictions of dangerousness are often cited as reason to deprive “dangerous” offenders of more liberty than they otherwise would lose, they
are as pertinent to the ethics of prediction as they are to sentencing.

17
The classic Philadelphia birth cohort studies, e.g., found that 48.7 percent of nonwhite offenders in the 1945 cohort had their ﬁrst police contact before age 14, compared
with 30.8 percent for whites. The corresponding ﬁgures for the 1958 cohort were 41 and
27 percent (Tracey, Wolfgang, and Figlio 1990, chap. 10).
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III. The Defenses
The indictment is pretty formidable. Predictions of future violence are
more often wrong than right (Fazel et al. 2012): Of ﬁve positive predictions, three will be mistakes (false positives). The false positives are disproportionately black and other minority offenders (Angwin et al. 2016;
Flores, Bechtel, and Lowenkamp 2016). Many prediction instruments incorporate variables such as youth and gender that are per se unjust. All prediction instruments incorporate socioeconomic status variables that produce systematically harsher dispositions of black, other minority, and
disadvantaged offenders. All prediction instruments incorporate criminal
history variables that are inﬂated for black and other minority offenders
by racially biased and disparate practices, racial proﬁling, and street-level
drug enforcement that targets minority individuals and neighborhoods.
The defenses are less weighty. One is that normative punishment theories provide no meaningful bar to reliance on predictions (Husak 2019b).
A second is that prevention of predicted harms to victims is so overwhelmingly important that it trumps concerns about proportionality and equal
treatment (Ryberg [2019], as devil’s advocate). A third is that there is nothing special about subordinating individuals to collective or organizational
interests on the basis of predictions. Happens all the time: actuarial statistics are used in credit scoring and setting insurance premiums; statistical
analyses underlie public health policies and medical practices; quarantines
conﬁne individuals (Imrey and Dawid 2015; Douglas 2019). A fourth is
that concerns about racial and other disparities in punishment are misplaced: people who score badly on predictive variables commit disproportionate numbers of crimes and should bear disproportionate preventive
burdens (Slobogin 2019).
A. Punishment Theory
If everyone agreed that punishment policies and practices should be
assessed only in relation to their crime-reductive effects, the elements
of the indictment would be immaterial. As far as I can tell, no one believes
that concerning themselves and people they care about.18 The Christian
18
As a matter of political self-interest, American politicians often support policies such
as life without parole for minors, three-strikes sentences of 25 years to life for minor property offenders, and decades-long prison sentences for street-level drug sellers that cannot
be justiﬁed by any principled theory of punishment. In the 1970s and 1980s, conservative
politicians deplored US Supreme Court decisions that strengthened defendants’ procedural protections. Throughout a long life of observing the criminal law, however, my experience has been that politicians and other powerful people charged with crimes believe
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New Testament and Kant’s categorical imperative agree that we should
want and do for others what we want done for ourselves. Everyone believes that crime seriousness matters. Probably no one disagrees that
lengthy imprisonment for routine trafﬁc or parking offenses would be
unjustly severe, even if an effective deterrent, and that probation for
stranger rapes would be unduly lenient, even if harsher punishments had
no preventive effects.
The likeliest theoretical justiﬁcations for predictive sentencing are utilitarian, trading justice to individual offenders for greater crime prevention.
Bentham, however, did not believe that prevention of crime justiﬁes injustice to individuals. He endorsed strong criminal law defenses—including
insanity, intoxication, and ignorance of law—so that only blameworthy
people are convicted. He argued that punishment is evil and—his frugality
principle—should be imposed only when the offender’s suffering would be
outweighed by greater suffering averted for others. He insisted that punishments be proportioned to the seriousness of offenses—for deterrent,
not retributive, reasons—and that sentencing decisions take sympathetic
account of myriad personal characteristics of individual offenders (Bentham 1970, pp. 52, 158, 169). The only contemporary mainstream consequentialist theory, Braithwaite and Pettit’s “Republican Theory of Criminal Justice” (1990, 2001), recognizes proportionate retributive upper
limits on punishment. It otherwise rejects retributive values and calls in
every case for the least punitive disposition on which the victim, the offender, and others close to them agree. Bentham’s utilitarianism would
not accommodate use of predictions of dangerousness in sentencing.
The frugality principle forbids imposition in any individual case of
punishments more severe than deterrent considerations justify. The false
positive problem puts the kibosh on predictive sentencing; how for this
defendant could a prediction that we know is probably wrong justify a
harsher punishment?
Retributive theories vary. Kant’s foundational account insists that
offenders receive “deﬁnitely the quality and quantity of punishment”
they deserve, no more, no less (2017, p. 115). That leaves no role for
predictions, although it may permit them to be taken into account in

as to themselves, their families, and close colleagues that justice requires the full panoply of
procedural protections, compassionate consideration of personal circumstances, and observance of general principles of justice in punishment including imposition of the least
severe possible sentence.
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choosing between punishments of equal severity (e.g., Ryberg 2019).19
This was Andreas von Hirsch’s view three decades ago (von Hirsch,
Wasik, and Green 1989). In practice, however, it could apply to only
a small minority of crimes. Few minor ones would warrant imprisonment in place of a community punishment, and there is no case to be
made that a longer preventive prison term is punitively equivalent to a
shorter one. For serious crimes, no sanction other than capital punishment has the same or greater incapacitative effect than imprisonment.
Kant and von Hirsch are “positive” retributivists who argue that offenders not only may but must be punished as much as they deserve. However, there are also “negative” retributivists who argue that blameworthiness
sets only upper limits on severity; offenders may be punished as much as they
deserve, but they need not be. This may be what Husak (2019b) had in mind
when he wrote, “If we have good reason to inﬂict different amounts of
punishment on two offenders who have committed equally serious crimes,
we should not be worried that our decision does not preserve proportionality.” The consensus view noted above among authors of leading metaanalyses that violence predictions should not be used in sentencing, however, casts serious doubt whether current knowledge provides “good reason”
to allow pursuit of predictive goals to trump proportionality.
Husak’s position rejects Kantian retributive and Benthamite utilitarian
insistence on comparable treatment of people who committed comparable
crimes.20 It also abandons the almost ubiquitous belief among retributivists
of all stripes that proportionality between offense seriousness and maximum punishment severity is a fundamental requirement of justice.
Although it can never be self-evident in a given case precisely what
punishment is required, that problem was solved as a practical matter
long ago. Wide agreement exists on the relative seriousness of different
crimes. Uncontroversial scales of relative offense seriousness can be devised for particular places and times. So can parallel scales of punishment
severity (Duus-Otterström 2019). The two can then be linked. Compa19
Kant (2017, p. 115) wrote explicitly of substitution of punishments so they would be
subjectively comparably burdensome. One example is that “someone of high standing given
to violence could be condemned not only to apologize for striking an innocent citizen inferior
to himself but also to undergo a solitary conﬁnement involving hardship; in addition to the
discomfort he undergoes, the offender’s vanity would be painfully affected, so that through
his shame like would be ﬁttingly repaid with like” for an offense for which a “social inferior”
would be called on only to apologize.
20
But with major differences. Both want sanctions—for Kant, calculated on the gravity
of wrongdoing, and for Bentham on deterrence calculations—to be adjusted to take account of differences (which Bentham called sensibilities) between offenders.
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rably severe punishments can be speciﬁed for comparably serious crimes
and proportionately different ones for diversely serious ones. There is
no room for prediction; the overarching goals are to assure equal treatment by linking blameworthiness to punishment.
The alternative to Kant’s view is negative retributivism. Monahan
(2017), for example, has argued that predictions can be properly used
as long as upper limits based on offense seriousness are respected and predictions are used to mitigate sentences for low-risk offenders but not to
increase them for high-risk offenders. He refers to Virginia’s approach
that incorporates predictions into guidelines for diversion to alternative
punishments of offenders otherwise bound for imprisonment.21
Morris’s (1974) version of negative retributivism, “limiting retributivism,” provided a more fully developed proposal. For every crime there
is a maximum punishment that may justly be imposed. This varies with
offense seriousness and thus provides proportionate limits. For some
crimes—I used stranger rape earlier as an example—there may be minimums that must ordinarily be observed. The default is always the minimum; like Bentham, Morris urged recognition of a principle of parsimony
that forbade imposition of unnecessary suffering. The minimum, however,
can be exceeded for good reason.
From a predictive sentencing perspective, so far so good. Morris
insisted that there be good evidence-based reasons to justify harsherthan-minimum punishment. Concerning predictions of dangerousness,
he was emphatic: four false positives for every two true positives is not
good enough. That would cause too much undeserved suffering. It is
unlikely that improvements in accuracy over four decades—three false
positives for every two true positives—would have changed his view.
The general case to be made is weaker now than in 1974. Morris wrote before much evidence had accumulated on the racial disparities inexorably
produced by predictive sentencing and without considering the implications of use of youth, gender, race-correlated socioeconomic status, and
bias-contaminated criminal history variables. Morris’s limiting retributivism does not provide the license prediction proponents might wish for.
Predictive sentencing is thus incompatible with mainstream retributive punishment theories. This is conﬁrmed by the theoretical literature
21
This does not really work at least in Virginia because the main guidelines are only
advisory and judges may depart both downward and upward. Negative retributivist theories envision an unbreachable upper limit. The “normal” Virginia guideline recommendation is only that, not an upper limit. I discuss other problems below.
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on the role of prior criminal history in sentencing new crimes. It is a
cliché but true that past crimes are the best predictor of future crimes,
which is why criminal history variables are the most predictively powerful (Hoffman 1983; Monahan 2017). Empirical evidence and common
experience document that there is a “recidivist premium”; all else being
equal, most judges impose harsher punishments on repeat offenders
than on ﬁrst offenders (Reitz 2010). There is solid evidence that most
people think they should (e.g., Roberts 2008, 2011).
Nonetheless, nearly every retributivist philosopher who has considered the matter has concluded that it cannot be justiﬁed (e.g., among
many more, Fletcher 1978; Ryberg 2001; Bagaric 2010; Lippke 2016):
“did the crime, did the time”; “paid his or her debt to society.” More punishment now for this crime for predictive reasons, because there was an
earlier crime, is double counting, in effect attaching an increment of additional punishment to this crime to punish the earlier one more fully.
Several efforts have been made to argue that committing an earlier crime
somehow increases an offender’s culpability in relation to the new one.
One argument is that recidivists deserve additional punishment because
their behavior demonstrates deﬁance of the judge or the state or is evidence of bad character (e.g., Lee 2010). Those claims have no place in
a free society: citizens are entitled to be deﬁant, eccentric, and difﬁcult.
“Bad character” is in the eyes of the beholder and in any case is nowhere
a criminal offense. The other argument is that recidivists have a greater
obligation than others to be law-abiding (Bennett 2010). The law, however, makes the same demands of all citizens. No one except possibly the
arguments’ proponents has been persuaded by either of these analyses.
If punishments may not justly be increased to take account of earlier
convictions, it is difﬁcult to imagine principled arguments for why punishments may be increased on the basis of predictions of future offending
that are in turn substantially based on criminal history variables. Ryberg
(2019) intensively mines retributive theories looking for an overlooked
nugget that can justify predictive sentencing. No such luck. He concludes
thusly: “Though there is some appeal in pursuing justice and in preventing future crimes, you cannot to a full extent get both.”
B. Public Safety
Everyone is in favor of public safety, but that is not the only fundamental value involved. Sentencing also implicates fairness, proportionality, equal treatment, and parsimony (Tonry 2018b). Any rational person
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would want these additional values to be honored if he or she or a loved
one was charged with a crime. It is difﬁcult to develop a morally persuasive explanation for why we as individuals deserve those things but other
people whom we do not know or care about do not. Unless someone can
develop a fully elaborated consequentialist theory of punishment that
does not incorporate those values and justiﬁes predictive sentencing, a
principled case for predictive sentencing cannot be made.
This does not mean that pursuit of crime prevention and public safety
need be abandoned. Systems such as those in Scandinavian countries,
Germany, and the Netherlands in which punishment is based primarily
on blameworthiness and which allow only minor increases for criminal
history do not have higher crime rates than the United States. Insofar as
the operation of the criminal justice system deters wrongful behavior,
systems of proportionate punishment will continue to do so. They will
contribute to moral education by reinforcing basic social norms of right
and wrong. Deserved terms of imprisonment will continue to incapacitate inmates from committing new offenses in the community. Other
demonstratively effective strategies of community, developmental, and
situational crime prevention, if pursued, will continue to do their work.
Expecting more than that from predictive sentencing is in any event
unrealistic. The best available evidence cautions against believing that
changes in sanctions policies have signiﬁcant crime reduction effects
(Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014, chap. 5; Tonry 2016).
C. Actuarial and Quarantine Analogies
Two arguments are made. The ﬁrst is that, ho hum, there is nothing
special about predictive sentencing: actuarial risk calculations affect private lives throughout modern society. There has been a “proliferation of
statistical and other algorithmic prediction tools in banking, insurance,
marketing, medicine, and other ﬁelds. . . . Prediction need not be highly
accurate at the individual level for major collective beneﬁt to accrue”
(Imrey and Dawid 2015, pp. 25, 30).
So what’s the problem? There are several. The most important is that
the application of predictions in sentencing causes undeserved suffering
to individuals whose punishments are increased, usually through lengthening of prison terms. Most other uses of actuarial prediction affect people’s lives as private citizens. It may be disappointing to be denied a loan,
insurance policy, or apartment lease, or be asked to pay higher rates, or not
be offered a marketing opportunity. Those burdens, however, are not
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comparable to being imprisoned when otherwise a community punishment would be imposed or receiving a longer prison term. Actuarial predictions in medicine are used to beneﬁt individuals by means of improved
diagnostic capacities, not to cause suffering.
A criminal conviction is an authoritative declaration by the state that an
individual engaged in morally blameworthy behavior. Punishment is meant
to cause suffering—some philosophers approvingly refer to “hard treatment”—and is inherently stigmatizing in the eyes of the general public.
Other uses of actuarial prediction are private and are neither intended to
cause suffering nor handled in ways that expose individuals to public stigma.
People who are denied loans or insurance policies may feel regretful, humiliated, even stigmatized, but only in private. No one else need know.
Arguments have been offered that predictive sentencing can be justiﬁed by analogy to public health quarantines. People carrying or exposed
to contagious diseases are sometimes conﬁned to eliminate or minimize
the spread of contagion. However, except for rare circumstances such as
the early periods of awareness of HIV when drug users and homosexuals
were “blamed” for their afﬂictions, having a contagious disease (e.g.,
measles, typhoid, malaria, Ebola) is seldom personally stigmatizing. In
rare circumstances when stigma attaches, decent people regard it as unjust and morally wrong. In any case, quarantines are not for lengthy ﬁxed
terms; they end when the risk passes or reaches acceptable levels. People
subject to quarantines are not held in prisons and in a decent society receive sympathy and compassion. They are afforded the greatest material
comfort that conditions allow, with as few limitations as possible on the
freedoms enjoyed by other citizens. Preventive conﬁnement based on
risk predictions is not like that.
The arguments that preventive detention is morally equivalent to quarantine are unconvincing. Thomas Douglas (2019) tries mightily to demonstrate that quarantine is, or under some circumstances could be, indistinguishable. He assumes both sets of restrictions are morally undeserved
(for offenders, because in excess of what could otherwise be justiﬁed). He
sets aside the question of “soft moral difference,” whether preventive detention is typically more morally suspect than quarantine, and considers
only the narrower question of “hard moral difference,” whether preventive
detention is always in at least one respect more morally suspect.
Douglas concludes that preventive detention is not always worse in at
least one respect. He may or may not be right, but in the real world, as he
acknowledges, that is not important: “Whether preventive detention is
typically more problematic than quarantine will depend heavily on the

Predictions of Dangerousness in Sentencing

471

facts about how these two practices are typically imposed and what effects they normally have, on those subject to them, on those whom they
are intended to protect, and on those required to fund them” (2019; emphasis in original).
Other arguments that quarantine offers a valid analogy to preventive detention are no more convincing. Gregg Caruso (2016) and Derk Pereboom (2014) argue that quarantine and preventive detention are indistinguishable to adherents of free will skepticism: “What we do, and the way
we are, is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control and because
of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the basic desert
sense—the sense that would make us truly deserving of blame or praise”
(Caruso 2016, p. 26).
Caruso and Pereboom agree that neither “dangerous” offenders nor
carriers of serious contagious diseases are morally responsible for the risks
they pose and may be subjected to state controls to minimize risk. They
posit reciprocal state obligations to offer minimal intrusions, humane
conditions, and serious treatment efforts. Given their premise of free will
skepticism, those are plausible and necessary ethical propositions.
Arguments about free will, hard determinism, and compatibilism are intellectually interesting and conceptually important. However, accepting
the validity of Caruso’s and Pereboom’s analyses requires ﬁrst accepting
the validity of free will skepticism. That is unlikely on a widespread basis
any time soon.
D. Group Differences in Offending
The argument is that the aim of prediction instruments is to predict
crimes, that some instruments (e.g., COMPAS) predict future offending
by black and white people with comparable accuracy, and accordingly
that the instruments are not statistically biased (Flores, Bechtel, and
Lowenkamp 2016). It may be regrettable, but if black, other minority, and
disadvantaged offenders generally disproportionately have characteristics
that predict future offending, so be it:
COMPAS is based on an actuary designed to inform the probability of
recidivism across its three stated risk categories. To expect the
COMPAS to do otherwise would be analogous to expecting an insurance agent to make absolute determinations of who will be involved in an accident and who won’t. Actuaries just don’t work that
way. This error discredits their [Angwin et al. 2016] main ﬁnding that
Black defendants were more likely to be incorrectly identiﬁed as
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recidivists (false positives) while white defendants were more likely to
be misclassiﬁed as nonrecidivists (false negatives). (Flores, Bechtel,
and Lowenkamp 2016, p. 45)
Two things about this quotation warrant mention. First, the quotation
acknowledges no reason for concern about suspect variables: COMPAS
uses every variable discussed in this essay except race.22 Second, the claim
that their analysis “discredits” Angwin et al.’s conclusions about racial
distributions of false positives and false negatives is refuted by their
own ﬁndings (see table 3 above presenting their ﬁndings on true and false
positive rates for black and white offenders concerning general recidivism). What they presumably meant is that racial disparities do exist
but are not important because they are simply by-products of an algorithm that is not statistically biased.
Flores, Bechtel, and Lowenkamp (2016) are interested only in predictive accuracy. This is made explicit when they offer two prediction
models with very different false positive and negative rates but reject
out of hand the model that makes fewer mistakes, as if any reasonable
person would agree: “The [second model’s effects]—a decrease in false
positive rates and an increase in false negative rates—might be preferred
by some, as it limits the number of individuals that are identiﬁed as
‘high-risk.’ For others with a low tolerance for recidivism and victimization, the [ﬁrst model] would be preferred” (p. 42). Use of socioeconomic
status and criminal history variables that differentially affect blacks and
whites does not to them, as Lady Catherine de Bourgh would put it, signify. To people concerned about racial injustice, it does.

IV. The Summation
Predictive sentencing cannot thus be justiﬁed either empirically or morally. To many people, however, predictive sentencing, especially concerning violence, is intuitively plausible. It provides supporters opportunity to express sympathy toward hypothetical future victims and to express

22
They note that when they added an interaction term between race and COMPAS into
their analyses, it did not improve predictive accuracy (Flores, Bechtel, and Lowenkamp
2016, p. 43). This is irrelevant, as modelers have recognized for four decades (Fisher
and Kadane 1983; Berk et al. 2018). Because race and other variables covary, most or all
of any race effect is carried by the other variables. They most likely found no separate race
effect because it was already present.
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disdain for people believed likely to be violent. Probably in realpolitik
terms, predictive sentencing will continue to command support from
elected politicians and many criminal justice ofﬁcials. What to do? A
number of options are available.

A. Abandon Predictive Sentencing
This would be the correct approach. Prevention of crime is an important public policy goal, but so are justice, fairness, equal treatment, and
parsimony. They importantly differ from crime prevention. Each derives
from fundamental ideas about human dignity and limits state power over
individual lives (Dan-Cohen 2002; Luban 2007; Waldron 2014). Predictive sentencing, by contrast, focuses only on hypothetical victims.
The way forward concerning punishment becomes clear when we recognize that punishment implicates multiple, competing values, including
not only deserved punishment and crime prevention but also fairness
and equal treatment. A comprehensive jurisprudence of just punishment
would incorporate four propositions (Tonry 2018b):
•

•

•

•

Justice as Proportionality: Offenders should never be punished more
severely than can be justiﬁed by their blameworthiness in relation
to the severity of punishments justly imposed on others for the same
and different offenses (von Hirsch 1985).
Justice as Fairness: Processes for responding to crimes should be
publicly known, implemented in good faith, and applied evenhandedly (Rawls 1958).
Justice as Equal Treatment: Defendants and offenders should be
treated as equals; their interests should be accorded concern and respect when decisions affecting them are made (Dworkin 1977).
Justice as Parsimony: Offenders should never be punished more severely than can be justiﬁed by appropriate, valid, normative purposes
(Tonry 1994).

Preventive sentencing cannot be justiﬁed if those values are respected. The
arguments concerning proportionality, equality, and parsimony are selfevident; predictive sentencing in its own terms violates them. It also
violates the fairness requirement though possibly less self-evidently. Few
prediction instruments have been validated using data for the populations
affected and are thus arbitrary in their application to individuals. The bases
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for prediction instruments sold by private companies are not disclosed; this
is deemed “proprietary information,” akin to trade secrets. Thus judges
and corrections ofﬁcials who use them do not know on what basis they
make decisions about individuals’ liberty. Defendants, of course, cannot
therefore challenge the basis of their sentences.
No country’s legal system perfectly observes those values, but many in
western and northern Europe try. In the United States, the case against
predictive sentencing is likely to fall on deaf ears. Less bold options that
would do less injustice are available.
B. Constrained Predictive Sentencing
Prevention concerns and prevailing emotionalism may make elimination of preventive sentencing unachievable. An unprincipled but more
saleable option might be to establish limits on increments of additional
punishment that can be imposed. Roberts and Frase (2019) propose maximum sentence increases of no more than 100 percent of the deserved
sentence as a limit. I have proposed 50 percent (Tonry 2016).
A more discriminant proposal needs working out. Under Roberts and
Frase’s proposal, for example, predictions could justify a 2-month sentence
if the starting point was 1 month, or a 40-year sentence if the starting point
was 20 years, as in the United States it often could be. Under my 50 percent
cap, a 20-year sentence could be increased to 30 years. All of these numbers
are unjustly severe. A more constrained approach might allow increments
ranging from the greater of 100 percent or 1 year for less serious offenses
to the lesser of 100 percent or 3 years for more serious ones.
Those proposals, however, make pretty heroic assumptions about the
willingness of American policy makers to constrain judges’ authority and
limit sentencing severity.
C. Predictive Mitigation
This is what Monahan (2017) proposes. It has the great defect that it
will usually worsen racial and class disparities, all else being equal, because predictions of lower risk usually result from the absence of socioeconomic, criminal history, and other characteristics disproportionately
associated with minority and disadvantaged offenders. The end result
will be the diversion of more white and advantaged offenders. Norval
Morris and I (1990) long ago argued that there may be something perverse about the argument that if some offenders will be treated unduly se-
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verely, concern for equal treatment requires that others also suffer unduly.
Monahan’s proposal might thus reduce severity for some offenders.
Some people no doubt believe that is desirable, even if it exacerbates racial disparities (so Morris believed; I was doubtful). BUT—a big but—
Monahan’s proposal can work only if there are strong “normal” limits
on sentencing severity, from which the mitigated sentence offers a reduction. Otherwise there will be nothing to stop judges and prosecutors from
providing mitigated sentences to low-risk offenders and imposing aggravated sentences on high-risk offenders. This is what happens under
Virginia’s “advisory” guidelines.
D. Limiting Retributivism
A stronger version of Monahan’s proposal is to allow mitigation for lowrisk offenders but establish strong upper limits for all offenders based on
offense seriousness. Only a handful of presumptive (Minnesota, Washington, Kansas) and mandatory (North Carolina) American guidelines systems
establish meaningful upper limits. In such places, Morris’s proposals could
work. The presumptive normal sentence in every case would be set at the
bottom of the guideline range. Low-risk offenders could receive sentences
below the normal minimum, most offenders the normal minimum, and
highest-risk offenders up to the maximum. This, however, could work only
if guidelines systems were radically reformulated. Current approaches provide ranges for particular offenders that take account of both offense seriousness and criminal history. The limiting retributivism approach could
work only if ranges were based solely on offense seriousness. Otherwise
criminal history variables used in prediction instruments would be double
counted.
E. Sanctions and Measures
Debates raged a century ago in the United States and Europe over the
wisdom and justice of indeterminate sentencing (Pifferi 2012, 2016).
Supporters argued that criminal behavior results primarily from environmental and psychological inﬂuences on individuals and that a
rational sentencing system would reject retributive ideas and focus on
rehabilitation and prompt release of the vast majority of corrigible offenders and the incapacitation of the rest. Opponents argued that moral
blameworthiness should not be abandoned as an animating idea but
should instead set limits on the state’s punishment powers.
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American jurisdictions—every one of them by the 1930s—adopted indeterminate sentencing. European countries including those in the
United Kingdom rejected it as unjust. To deal, however, with the problem of seemingly incorrigible dangerous offenders, European countries
created a distinction between sanctions, deserved punishments based on
blameworthiness, and measures, crime prevention powers based on assessments of risk. In theory, measures are not punishments but extraordinary
actions designed to deal with special problems. This is hypocritical, of
course, since extended conﬁnement will feel like additional punishment
to any affected offender, but it has worked much as was intended (cf. de
Keijser 2011). Measures targeting violence prevention are rarely used in
any country (e.g., in Scandinavia, Lappi-Seppälä [2016]), but they are
available for special cases. Anders Brejvik, the Norwegian mass murderer
of 77 people in 2011, was sentenced to 21 years’ imprisonment, the longest
term possible, but was also made subject to a measure. If when his “sanction” expires he continues to be considered dangerous, the measure
provides authority to continue to hold him.
The sanctions and measures distinction could in theory provide a mechanism for taming predictive sentencing in the United States. All offenders
would receive proportionate sanctions based on the seriousness of their
crimes and respecting concerns for fairness, equal treatment, and parsimony. A tiny number, a small fraction of 1 percent on the European pattern, might also be the objects of measures predicated on their dangerousness and permitting continued conﬁnement after expiration of their
prison sentences. Predictions could be used to identify cases in which a
measure might be appropriate. For such a system to be a realistic option,
however, there would need to be radical transformations in American popular, political, and legal cultures. That is unlikely in any foreseeable future.
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